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ABSTRACT
Bo~h strict liability and negJigence are efficient in the
short run when the number of firms causing harm is fixed. Only
strict liability is efficient in the long run when the number of
firms is variable. In general, the market price in the long run
under negligence is too low and too many firms enter the industry.
However, the optimal second-best negligence standard may result
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There are two competing rules of liability for controlling
activities like speeding or polluting which cause harm to others.
The rule of strict liability shifts the victitn's harm to the in-
jurer regardless of the injurer's behavior, while the rule of neg-
ligence shifts the burden to the injurer only if the injurer does
not take some specified amount of care.
Most formal analyses of strict liability and negligence.have
been in a non-market context like automobileacc'idents. l / These
studies conclude (or imply) that 'both rules are efficient when the
administering authority has sufficieritinformation to set the neg-
ligence standard'properly (in each 'case a defense of ,contributory
negligence may' b,e required). According to these analyses, strict
liability is efficierit because it fUlly internalizes the harm and
negligence is efficient because the injurer can be induced to take
exactly the specified amount of care and this amount can be set
efficiently~ For reasons which will become apparent, it is im-
portant to note that these models have assumed a fixed number of
injurers--for example, a predetermined number :of drivers.
Interestingly, most informal discussions of strict liability
and negligence have suggested that in a market setting negligence
may be inefficient even when the adminis,tering authority ,has per-
fect information. The argument is stated clearly in a discussion
of environmental control by Richard Stewart and James Krier:
Reflecting pollution costs in product price.s• If-2-
strict liability is not imposed for the residual
damages caused by partially controlled polluting
activity, these damages will not be reflected in
the price of commodities produced by such activity.
As a resu:l-t, commodities with whose production pol-
lution is associated will be underpriced relative
to commodities whose production causes no pollution,
resulting. in resource misallocation. [po 227]~/
This paper formally analyzes strictliability and neglige;nce
in a market setting. The discussion emphasizes the impact of the
rules on the market,price and on the number of. firms in the indus-
i
try. For simplicity, the damage caused by each firm is assumed to
be determined only by that firm's "care" (and not also by the firm's
output or the victim's behavior).ll
The argument that both strict liability and neg-ligenceare
efficient is correct in the short run when the number of firmscaus-
ing harm is fixed. The market price in the short run is the same
under strict liability and negligence despite the fact that under
the rule of negligence firms do not bear the cost of their harmful
activity. The argument that only strict liability is efficient is
correct in the long run when the number of firms is variable. When
the negligence standard corresponds to the efficient level of care,
the market price in the long run under negligence is too low and
too many firms enter the industry. However, when the standard is
chosen optimally, taking' into account the ipef.ficiency of the neg-
ligence rule, the standard exceeds t~e efficient level of care,
tbe price rises, and the number of firms ~alls. The optimal second-
best standard may actually result in the same price and number of-3-
·firms under negligence as under strict liability.4/
1. The Model
The analysis of strict liability and negligence is undertaken
in a very simple partial equilibrium model of a competitive industry
composed of n identical firms. Each firm's cost of producing q units
of output is C(q). The average cost function is assumed to be U-
shaped. Each firm's cost of taking :.:. units of care is z (care is
defined so that one unit costs one dollar). Associated with each
firm's level of care is an external damage D(z). Damages decrease
with care. Let P(s) be the industry's inverse demand function,
where s = nq is aggregate output. Social welfare Wequals the
benefits to consumers of output nq (assumed to be approxi-
mated by the area under the industry's inverse demand curve), less




W = f P(s)ds - nC(q) - nD(z) - nz.
o
In the short run, the number of firms is fixed.~ The social
optimum is defined by the q and z which maximize social welfare. From
(1) the first-order condition (all solutions· are assumed tobe unique in-
terior local optima) with respect to q may be written as
(2) P (nq) = C' (q) •
This has the usual interpretation that price equals marginal cost.
The first-order condition with respect to z is:
( 3) -D' (z) = 1.-4-
This states that the marginal benefits from an increase in care--re-
duced damages--equals the marginal cost of greater care.
In the long run, the number of firms is variable. The social
optimum is now defined by the q, z, and n which maximize social wel-
fare. From (1) the first-order condition with respect to n can be
written as
( 4) P (nq) = [C (q) + 8: z) + z] / q .
This has the usual interpretation that price equals average cost.
The social welfare maximizing values of the variables will be
indicated by an asterisk.
II. Short-Run Analysis
Under strict liability, each firm's problem is to maximize rev-
enues less production costs, external damages, and the cost of tak-
ing care:
(5) Max Pq - C(q) - D(z) - z.
q,z





-D' (z) = 1,
which coincide with the social optimum. This is not surprising
since strict liability fully internalizes the externality.




Max Pq - C(q) - D(z) - z,
q,z
I :<Z)
> - if z = z,
D(z) =
if z < z.
The first-order condition with respect to q is the same as (6). It
is easily shown that when z = z*, the level of care chosen by each
firm is z (see footnote 8 below). Thus, the social optimum can be
reached under negligence if the stc.ndard is chosen properly--equal
to the efficient level of care.
III. Long-Run Analysis
under strict liability, each firm chooses output and care to
maximize profits as indicated by (5), so that (6) and (7) are satis-
fied (implying at least that z = z*). In addition, equilibrium is
characterized by zero profits:
(9) P(nq)q -C(q) - D(z*) - z* = o.
This is equivalent to the condition for the social optimum that
price equals average cost. Thus, strict liability is efficient in
the long run.
Under negligence, assume initially that the standard is set at
the efficient level of care. Firms maximize profits by choosing
output and care according to (8), so that (6) is satisfied and
z= z*. The zero profit condition under negligence is therefore:
(10) P(nq)q - C(q) - z* = o.
T~is condition, along with (6), implies that the output of each
firm under negligence is too low, that the market price is too low,-6-
and that too many firms enter the industry.~/
Since the negligence outcome is not efficient when the standard
equals the efficient level of care, the optimal second-best standard
is of some interest. It can be demonstrated that, optimally chosen,
Z > z*.21 The reason for this is not hard to understand. Consider
a slight increase in the standard starting at z = z*. Since firms
will continue to meet the standard (they will over some range),
their costs will rise and, as a cons€~uence, so will the market
price. This has the beneficial effect of raising the output of each
firm (which was too low when z = z*) and of reducing the number of
firms•. The inefficiency created by inducing firms to take care
just above the efficient level is negligible since the effect on
social welfare of a marginal change in firms' care is zero at the
optimal level of care. Thus, it is desirable to increase the stan-
dard to some extent.
There is a limit to how high the standard can be set and still
induce firms to meet the standard. It is easy to show that the
highest feasible standard leads to the same price under negligence
as under strict liability; given this standard and the resulting
price, the output of each firm and the number of firms is efficient
under negligence.Y By reasoning similar to that used in the pre-
vious paragraph, it might seem, therefore, that the optimal second-
best standard should not be this high: the effect on social welfare
from lowering the level of care slightly (by lowering the standard)
would be beneficial while the effect on social welfare due to the
resulting marginal changes in firm output and the number of firms
would seem to be negligible. Perhaps surprisingly, this argument
is not correct. It can be demonstrated that the optimal second--7-
best standard under negligence might in fact lead to the same price,
firm output, and number of firms as under strict liability.~/
The basis for this conclusion can be explained as follows. It
is true that lowering the standard slightly from its highest feasi-
ble level improves social welfare through its effect on the level of
care and leaves social welfare unchanged by its effect on firm out-
put. It is not true, however, that lowering the standard leaves
social welfare unchanged through i~s effect on the number of firms
even though the number of firms was previously efficient. This is
because the optimal number of firms given an inefficiently high
level of care is less than the efficient number of firms. Since
lowering the standard reduces firms' costs and consequently in-
creases the number of firms, this effect on social welfare is un-
desirable. Therefore, whether the standard should be lowered de-
pends on the strength of this effect relative to the beneficial
effect on care.
IV. Discussion
(a) The model used here can be interpreted in two ways. The
most natural interpretation is that the damage from each firm's out-
put harms individuals who are not consumers of that output (e.g.,
a chemical industry pollutes a lake used for recreation). The
other interpretation is that the damage falls on the consumers of
the firm's output but they underestimate it (e.g., food producers
sell products with misperceived carcinogenic effects). Under the
second interpretation the model applies as it stands if the consum-
ers are totally ignorant of the harm. However, it is easy to modi-
fy it to allow the demand curve for the output to shift, depending-8-
on who bears the damage. As long as consumers underestimate the
damages, the basic results will apply.
(b) In a sense, the problem discussed here with the negligence
rule in a market setting is that it is not possible to apply the
rule to the industry as a whole. Courts are allowed to determine
only whether any particular f{rm is negligent with respect to the
activities over which it has control. This is not sufficient to
correctly regulate the number of fj,:,ms in the long run since all
l firms are acting the same way. No firm can be held responsible for
the number of firms in the industry.
(c) The same type of observation would apply in a non-market
setting in which there is free entry into the injuring activity.
For example, consider individuals who must decide whether to drive
to a nearby city--and thereby risk hitting innocent pedestrians--or
to not make the trip at all. Under a negligence rule, too many in-
dividuals will make the trip even if all who do so take the proper
amount of care in driving. The earlier formal analyses of strict
liability and negligence in a non-market context which concluded
that both rules were efficient assumed a fixed number of injurers.
(d) A version of the entry problem with the negligence rule
also can arise in a market setting in the short run. For example,
suppose there are a certain number of firms operating in the short
run in the absence of any regulation and that these firms have dif-
ferent costs of production (but, for simplicity, the same damage
functions and cost of taking care). The rule of strict liability--
which would still be efficient with this generalization--may drive
some of the costlier firms out of business. The rule of negligence,
however, may induce some firms which would have gone out of busi--9-
ness under strict liability to stay in business. As in the long run,
h ' 'II l' 1 ' d t f' 10/ t 1S W1resu t 1n too ow a pr1ce an 00 many 1rms.-
(e) The main point of this paper would not be affected if
each firm's total damage depends both on that firm's level of care
and its output. .If the negligence standard is' then appropriately
defined both with respect to the firm's care level and its output,
the present analysis would apply essentially unchanged. If, how-
ever, the negligence standard is still defined just in terms of
care (as is usual in practice), there would be an additional pro-
blem with the negligence rule besides the entry problem: it would
. 11/
distort the firm's choice between care and output.-·
(f) Some of the conclusions of this paper may be affected if
the total damage depends both on the firm's actions and the victim's
behavior (e.g., the care exercised in using a lawn mower). If the
number of potential victims is fixed--so there is no "entry issue"
on the victim's side--then the present results would be essentially
unchanged (putting aside the separate issue discussed in the pre-
viouscomment). An appropriate defense of contributory negligence--
in which the firm would be free of liability if the victim did not
take his efficient amount of care--should in principle be added to
both the strict liability and negligence rules. In equilibrium the
victim would take the correct amount of care, so the strict lia-
bility and negligence rules would operate as described in this paper.
If, however, the number of victims is variable, then in general
neither liability rule (with a defense of contributory negligence)
would be expected to be efficient. Negligence would lead to ex-
cessive entry on the injurer side, while strict liability would en-
h ·' t h'" d 12/ courage toomuc en ry on t e v1ct1m S1 e.--10-
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thor and not those of the NBER. Helpful comments were received
from participants in a number of seffiLnars.
1/ See, for example, the paper by John Brown. The only ex-
ceptions are discussed in footnote 4 below. There are also a num-
ber of formal studies of products liability in a market context
which do not compare strict liability to negligence.
~See also the discussions by Guido Calabresi (pp. 500-17),
Duncan Kennedy (pp. 54-61), and Richard Posner (pp. 137-42).
Michael Spence and Martin Weitzman (pp. 216-17) make a similar
point in the context of comparing taxes to standards.
l/ See comments (e) and (f) in Section IV below fora dis-
cussion of how the results are affected if harm also depends on
output or the victim's behavior.
v i/ A recent paper by Cento Veljanovski (pp. 17-22) uses a
diagrammatic model to show that negligence is inefficient in the
long run, but he does not consider the second-best problem. The
paper by Steven Shavell develops some closely related issues (see
comment (e) in Section IV below). Barry Weingast et ale compare
strict liability and negligence when, in effect, only the consumer
of a product affects the harm.
~/ If the number of firms is effectively variable in the short
run due to exit, the results may be different (see comment (d) in-11-
Section IV below) .
~/ Let qO and nO be the equilibrium values of q and n under
negligence. Substituting P(nq) = C' (q) into (9) and (10) gives ex-
pressions of the form C' (q)q C(q) - K = 0, where K is some con-
stant. It follows from C" > 0 (rising marginal costs are assumed)
that dq/dK > O. ° Thus, q < q*. Since P(nq) = C' (q) and C" > 0,
P (nOqo) (* *) < P n q •
7../ Firms will just meet the staildard if and only if z is be-
tween zero and some z > z* (see footnote 8 below). Given z in this
range, it follows from substituting (6) into (10) (with z replacing
z*) that the equilibrium q minimizes (C(q) + z)/q. Let q(z) be the
solution to this problem. Given q(z), the price is (C(q(z» + z)/
q(z). Thus, nq(z) = P-l[(C(q(z» + z)/q(z»). Let n(z) be the
solution of this expression for n. Substituting q(z) and n(z) into
(1) gives social welfare solely as a function of the standard,
W(q). After some manipulation, it can be seen that sign{W'} =
sign{-n'D - neD' + I)}. Since n' < 0 it follows from assum-
ing that D(z) + z is U-shaped that W' (z) > 0 for z ~ z*
~ If z < z, where z = D(z*) + z*, firms will choose z because
- A Z < Z + D(z) for all z < z. If z = z, firms are indifferent between
z and z*. If z > z, firms will choose z*. Thus, the highest feasi-
ble standard is z (or arbitrarily close to it). Given z = z, it
follows from the discussion in footnote 7 above that q(z) = q* and
that the price is (C(q*) + D(z*) + Z*)/q*i since q and P(nq) are
the same as under strict liability, n must also be the same.
~ It is sufficient to show that it is possible that W'(z) > 0
for all z < z. Recall from footnote 7 above that sign {WI} = sign
{ -n'D - neD' + I)}. Since D' (z), n(z), and n' (z) are continuous
f · < <'" h b dd unctlons on 0 = z = z, t ey are oun e . Thus, if D(Z) is suffi--12-
ciently large, the result follows.
10/ This point is illustrated diagrammatically in the context
of comparing taxes to subsidies in my paper.
11/ See Shavell's paper. Since he treats the industry as com-
posed of one competitively behavin~ firm whose harm depends on care
and output, he does not raise the problem of controlling the number
of firms.
12/ An analogous result is show~ by Shavell when the damage
depends on the levels of care and activity of one injurer and one
victim. The same point should apply when damages depend on care
and the number of injurers and victims.-13-
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